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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Violation 
of a Protective Order, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1997). This Court invokes jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in convicting Culley of 
violation of a protective order when there was no evidence that 
Culley was properly served with the order. When examining the 
sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal bench trial, the 
reviewing court applies a "clearly erroneous" standard: if the 
trial court's verdict in a criminal case is "against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the 
[verdict] will be set aside." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); City of Orem v. Lee, 846 P.2d 450 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) ; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) . Whether a person has been "properly 
served" is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. In Re 
Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350, 1354 (Utah 1993); Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 
1182, 1184 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-108, Protective orders restraining abuse of 
another--violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to 
a protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 
30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, 
1 
Juvenile Courts, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures 
Act, or a foreign protective order as described in Section 30-6-12, 
who intentionally violates that order after having been properly 
served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater 
penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse 
Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a 
domestic violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to 
increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4,2. Protective orders--Ex parte protective 
orders--Modification of orders--Service of process--Duties of the 
court 
• * • * 
(5)(a) Each protective order shall include two separate 
portions, one for provisions, the violation of which are criminal 
offenses, and one for provisions, the violation of which are civil 
violations, as follows: 
(i) criminal offenses are those under Subsections 30-6-4.2(2) (a) 
through (e), and under Subsection 30-6-4.2(3)(a) as it refers to 
Subsections 30-6-4.2(2)(a) through (e); and 
(ii) civil offenses are those under Subsections 30-6-4 .2(2) (f) 
through (h) , and Subsection 30-6-4.2(3) (a) as it refers to 
Subsections 30-6-4.2 (2) (f) through (h) . 
(b) The criminal provision portion shall include a statement 
that violation of any criminal provision is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) The civil provision portion shall include a notice that 
violation of or failure to comply with a civil provision is subject 
to contempt proceedings. 
(6) The protective order shall include: 
(a) a designation of a specific date, determined by the court, 
when the civil portion of the protective order either expires or is 
scheduled for review by the court, which date may not exceed 150 
days after the date the order is issued, unless the court indicates 
on the record the reason for setting a date beyond 150 days; 
(b) information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate 
identification of the respondent, such as social security number, 
driver license number, date of birth, address, telephone number, 
and physical description; and 
(c) a statement advising the petitioner that: 
(i) after three years from the date of issuance of the 
2 
protective order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the criminal 
portion of the protective order; 
(ii) the petitioner should, within the 30 days prior to the end 
of the three-year period, advise the court of the petitioner's 
current address for notice of any hearing; and 
(iii) the address provided by the petitioner will not be made 
available to the respondent. 
• * • * 
(8)(a) The county sheriff that receives the order from the 
court, pursuant to Subsection (5) (a) , shall provide expedited 
service for orders for protection issued in accordance with this 
chapter, and shall transmit verification of service of process, 
when the order has been served, to the statewide domestic violence 
network described in Section 30-6-8. 
• * * * 
(12) Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific 
than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding protective 
orders, the provisions of this chapter govern. 
Utah
 R u^ e Q£ civji Procedure 4. ess. 
• * • • 
(h) Manner of Proof. In a case commenced under Rule 3(a) (1) , 
the party serving the process shall file proof of service with the 
court promptly, and in any event within the time during which the 
person served must respond to the process, and proof of service 
must be made within ten days after such service. Failure to file 
proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. In 
all cases commenced under Rule 3(a) (1) or Rule 3(a) (2), the proof 
of service shall be made as follows: 
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, United States Marshal, or 
the deputy of any of them, by certificate with a statement as to 
the date, place, and manner of service; 
• * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By amended information, Murray City charged Roderick Culley of 
violating a protective order "on the 10th day of October [1996] 
through the 17th day of January 1 9 9 7 . . . " (R. at 16) A bench 
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trial was held on September 5, 1997, and the trial judge convicted 
Culley of the offense. (Transcript at 2, 29) [Hereinafter 
"Trans."] 
To be guilty of the crime of violation of a protective order 
it is necessary that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused was "properly served" with the order before 
he violated the order. No evidence of proper service was adduced 
at trial, so the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof. 
Culley should have been acquitted. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At trial, Culley's ex-wife Lisa Stout testified for the 
prosecution. Stout testified that she and Culley had been 
separated for about four years and that they shared two children. 
She stated that in September of 1996, she applied for a protective 
order against Culley. She and Culley appeared at a hearing on her 
application and the application was granted. A copy of a certified 
copy of the protective order was admitted into evidence. (Trans, 
at 4-7) 
There was no evidence that Culley was properly served with the 
actual order. In closing argument, the prosecutor merely observed 
that Culley was present when the order was granted and that there 
were "some boxes checked on the on the [sic] protective order that 
suggests he was there along with [counsel] when it was granted." 
The trial judge found that a lawful protective order was in place 
on the January 16, 1997, but he did not specifically find that 
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Culley had been properly served with the order. (Trans, at 26, 28) 
The protective order prohibited Culley "from directly or 
indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning or otherwise 
communicating with the petitioner except for visitation." (Trans, 
at 8) 
Stout testified that she had had contact with Culley after the 
issuance of the protective order. On direct examination, Stout 
related that between October 10, 1996, and January 17, 1997, she 
received at least three phone calls each week from Culley. Stout 
testified that the phone calls sometimes dealt with matters other 
than visitation. On cross-examination, she stated that she 
received phone calls from Culley on the 16th of January, but she 
did not say what was discussed during those calls. Stout testified 
that she received about six phone calls from Culley between ten 
o'clock at night and two o'clock in the morning. (Trans, at 9-12) 
However, counsel questioned Stout regarding records of phone 
calls on her caller I.D. Specifically, and contrary to her 
testimony on direct examination, she conceded that the caller I.D. 
had shown only three calls on the 16th of January (12:01 a.m., 
12:32 a.m., and 8:25 a.m.). Stout also admitted that during this 
period of time Culley had advised her that their daughter was ill 
and complaining of headaches. (Trans, at 12, 18, 21) 
Culley testified in his own behalf regarding the telephone 
calls on January 16, 1997. He stated that his daughter Libby had 
been complaining of terrible headaches and had been vomiting, and 
he had called Stout to get her opinion about what he should do. 
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Culley testified that he thought he could contact Stout to discuss 
the childrens' medical problems, that he believed that such contact 
was not a violation of the protective order, and that he did not 
intend to violate the protective order. (Trans, at 20-22) 
Finally, Culley provided unrebutted testimony that his 
daughter was the one who asked him to contact Stout. (Trans, at 
25) 
The trial judge convicted Culley, and concluded that contact 
to discuss a medical problem suffered by one of the children was 
not a defense to the crime. (Trans, at 29) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was no evidence that Culley was "properly served" with 
the protective order before he made contact with Lisa Stout. 
Service of process of a protective order is described in Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-6-4.2(8)(a), which requires the county sheriff to serve 
the respondent named in a protective order. Rule 4(h) (1) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the sheriff to file a 
certificate of service with the court. Because the prosecution 
presented no evidence that service was properly accomplished, or 
done at all, Culley's conviction cannot stand. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in convicting Culley of violation 
of a protective order because there was no evidence that 
Culley was properly served with the order. 
Violation of a protective order consists of the following 
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elements, each of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(1) a person is a respondent in a protective order, (2) the order 
was issued pursuant to Utah law, (3) the order was properly served 
on the respondent, and (4) the respondent intentionally violated 
the order after it was served. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108. 
Culley's argument involves the third element--proper service. The 
issue is whether service of process (on the order itself and not 
just the petition) was properly made in compliance with Utah law. 
There was no evidence at trial that process was properly made, and 
so the prosecution did not meet its burden at to the proper service 
element of the offense.1 Accordingly, there was insufficient 
evidence to convict Culley. 
The protective order in this case stemmed from a domestic 
civil proceeding. Hence, proper service of the order is set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2 (8) (a) of the Cohabitant Abuse Act, 
which requires the county sheriff to serve process of all orders 
issued under the statute. Rule 4(h) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure mandates that if process is served by the sheriff's 
office, the sheriff must file a certificate with the court 
containing the date, place, and manner of service.2 
1
 Under the plain language of section 76-5-108, it is clear 
that proof of proper service is an element of the offense, and not 
simply a jurisdictional matter as it would be in a civil lawsuit. 
Therefore, proof of proper service is part of the prosecution's 
burden at trial rather than a jurisdictional issue to be raised by 
a defendant in advance of trial. 
2
 "Service of process" is the term used in section 30-6-
4.2(8)(a). Service of process is distinguished from service of 
other pleadings and papers, which is controlled by Rule 5, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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At trial there was evidence presented, through Lisa Stout, 
that a hearing was held on Stout's petition for a protective order 
and that Culley was present at the hearing accompanied by counsel. 
There was no evidence presented as to how Culley learned about the 
hearing. There was no evidence that the hearing was preceded by an 
ex parte protective order or that such order, if issued, was 
properly served on Culley by the sheriff's office. See Reed, 806 
P.2d at 1185 (uncontroverted evidence that sheriff left summons at 
home of defendant's parents and made required return of service). 
In closing argument the prosecutor stated that Culley was present 
when the order was granted and that there were "some boxes checked 
on the on the- [sic] protective order that suggests he was there 
along with [counsel] when it was granted.11 The trial judge found 
that a lawful protective order was in place on January 16, 1997, 
but he did not specifically find that Culley had been properly 
served with the order. (Trans, at 26, 28) Indeed, the judge could 
not find that Culley had been properly served since there was no 
evidence he had been served. One may infer that because Culley was 
at the hearing he had been served with the application filed by 
Lisa Stout, but the order itself could not have been signed until 
the hearing took place. Under section 76-5-108 it is the signed 
order, not the petition, that binds the conduct of a respondent or 
defendant, and for purposes of attributing criminal liability under 
the statute the order could only become binding when "properly 
served" on Culley. 
This issue does not reflect a mere technicality, but instead 
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encompasses fundamental fairness concerns under the notice 
requirement of the Due Process Clause. If Culley was never 
properly served with the order, there can be no assurance that he 
received and read the contents of the order. In determining what 
he was permitted to do under the order, he may have been relying on 
his memory of what happened at the hearing or what his lawyer told 
him. The legislature could have chosen to include more flexible 
language in the statute regarding the manner in which a respondent 
was to be put on notice that he was subject to criminal sanction 
for violating a protective order. But the language used in the 
statutory scheme is clear and absolute: the manner of proper 
service is dictated by section 30-6-4.2 (8) (a) , andU.R.C.P. 4(h)(1) 
requires the filing of a certificate with the court by the sheriff 
proving process was served. The record in this case is void of any 
evidence that this occurred. 
Culley's argument does not suggest that failure to comply with 
the terms of the order would have to go unpunished. On the 
contrary, the judicial officer who signed the order still had the 
jurisdiction to issue Culley with a contempt citation and punish 
him accordingly. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-17, 78-32-1(5), 78-32-
10. In addition, there is nothing to prevent proper service of the 
order now. Simply put, at trial the court received no evidence 
that Culley had been served with the protective order in compliance 
with section 30-6-4.2(8) (a). Accordingly, until properly served, 
he cannot be held criminally liable for violating the order. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Culley requests 
this Court to reverse the judgment of conviction. 
DATED this Q day of June, 1998. 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA 
Lawyers for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant was mailed or hand-delivered on the ^v day of June, 
1998, to: 
Murray City Prosecutor 
5025 South State 
Murray, UT 8410 7 
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D. GILBERT ATHAY (0143) 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA (6986) 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone; (801) 363-707 4 
Lawyer for Defendant 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY PTVISION 
SALT LAKE COUN'l V , S'lAIK <J\ i'AH 
MURRAY CITY, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Case No. 9710 00369 
RODERICK CULLEY," 
: Judge Joseph Fratto 
Defendant. 
Please take notice that defendant Roderick Culler, by and 
through his lawyers P, Gilbert Athay and MiJhaei ! ji/;j.a, 
appeals the judgment and conviction in the above captioned 
matter. Judgment and conviction were entered on October 14, 
1997. 
DATED: November 14, 19 9 7, 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA 
Lawyers for Defendant 
X. 
J 
6^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I
 certify that: a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, on the )y day of 
November, 19 91, toi 
Murray City Prosecutor 
5025 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Randall Gaither 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
2 
milaSLJSl 
Defendant's address 
CRIMINAL JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Case No. _ 
APPEARANCES/PLEA 
•The above entitled case came on for arraigninent/pre-trial/rrial/preliminary hearine before the Honprabl 
., Judge of the above ent^ed cpui? op th^^y/^-day of =J^/j 
. . . . , , j 
9 v - 7 Plaintiff was represented by ' L 
ic  '-A bis •District Attorney 
jO-Murray City Attorney. 
I.U.The defendant appeared in person and wasAvno not represented by . ._ as counsel. 
[J The defendant failed to appear, and the Court finding that the defendant had received proper notice of the trial date and had 
voluntarily absented himself therefrom, the trial is ordered to proceed in absentia 
O The defendant entered his plea of guilty to the following charge(s): 
Count I Count II _ 
Count IH Count IV 
JUDGMENT 
After hearing the evidence in llie mallei and taking into consideration the arguments of" the parties, the Court finds the 
M) Guilty ( ) Not Guiity ( ) Dismissed 
f ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed ( ) Amended to 
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed ( ) Amended to 
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed ( ) Amended to 
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed ( ) Amended to 
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed ( ) Amended to 
On the 
h 
iU day of 
SENTENCE 
9 1 
(1) Imprisoned in the 
(2) Ordered to pay a fine in the 
(3) The Court suspended $ 
(4) Home confinement for 
(5) Work in a community service program for a period of , 
choice/ . 
(6) Ordered to pay Legal Defender fee in the amount of S 
(7) Submit to outpatient/inpatient treatment at 
, 19 * i the Court sentenced the defendant as follows 
jail/prison for a period of -^ ^--> ^clayi/months/years, and 
ount of $ V y y O . f t r ^ . 
i^^oftnefme and 1 > ^ 
days/months in lieu of jail monitored by 
_£jflpys/months/years of the jail sentence. 
days/hours in lieu of jail/fine at charity of 
to be completed by 
for a period of 
days/months Aftercare as deemed necessary by the treating facility. 
(8) Pica held in abeyance for a period of days/months. Count(s) 
dismissed/reduced to __ 
(9) Count(s) 
may be 
if no further violations. 
and payment of $ 
(10) Deft to pay restitution in the amount of $ . 
the Court/ 
_. to be dismissed/reduced upon completion of Traffic School/Defensive Driving Course 
cost by . 
All restitution is to be payed to 
(11) Court ordered term of probaljon for a period of 
who will reimburse the victtm(s). 
«V. 
No further violations of the law. 
Antabuse , „ . times per week monitored by __IS 
^ V J m a r ^ K ^ daysy^ TomE^ defendant to be supervised 
under the following conditions: 
. Weekly AA meetings for „ , weeksf**» O^f-
—CoPCf> 
JCOL _&. o* - *U \x .»_* r£_=L 
— (12) Defendant is granted a stay to . 
to commence serving this jail/prison sentence. Defendant to report to 
— (13) lo be payed at $ per month beginning 
DATED this day of dofok^ 
Defendant received a (copy of the above judgment and sentence on the date the judge sign. 
C D 
RPR 25 PP1 
nn^T U y^ u I 
RANDY B.HART (#1399) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5025 South State Street 
Post Office Box 57520 
Murray, Utah 84157-0520 
Telephone: (801) 264-2642 
MURRAY DEPT. 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RODERICK J. CULLEY 
4265 S. 900 E. 
Salt Lake City, L 
DOB: 10/19/51 
Defendant. 
ILED BY: RANDY B. HART 
MURRAY CITY 
AMENDED 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
OTN: 
Release Type: None 
) 
) I III III II II I III III II I I I I ll I , 
) 
) DL: #Ut. 2637324_ 
l<~3b<jf 
$ 6-^i-^n 
The undersigned complainant, Cindy L. Tooms, under oath, states on information 
and belief that the defendant committed, in Murray City, State of Utah, the crime(s) of: 
I 
VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER, to wit: That on the 10th day of October through 
the 17th day of January 1997, the defendant, being a person who has been restrained 
from abusing or contacting another or to remain away from the premises of the other's 
residence, employment, or other place as ordered by the court under a protective order 
or exparte protective order issued, did violate that order, at or near 309 E. 450n s #7, 
Murray, Utah, in violation of Section 76-5-108, Utah Code Annotated, a oic <K 
Misdemeanor. 
nformatinn is IUM'II II|IHII ilir cviiJi'iii 11 obtained from the following witnesses: 
OFFICER: L Gibbs, MCPD 
DETECTIVE: J. Peterson, MCPD 
AGENCY CASE NUMBER: 97-747 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant, Murray City Attorney, based upon information provided by Detective 
J. Peterson, Murray City Police Department, hereby states that on or about the 10th day 
of October 1996 through and including the 17th day of January 1997, at or near 309 E. 
4500 S., #7, Murray City, Utah, the defendant, Roderick J. Culley, did place telephone 
calls to the victim's, Lisa Stouts, residence on occasions from October 10,1996 between 
the hours of 11:45 p.m. to January 17, 1997 8:25 a.m. The phone calls were on the 
victim's caller I.D. Box. A protective order was signed by Judge Casey in the Third District 
Court on 9/26/96 prohibiting defendant from contacting, harassing and telephoning the 
victim except for arranging for visitation of the children. 
Cindy L. Tooms (Affiant) 
Murray City Prosecutor 
